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AbSTRAcT
Are taxation and public service requirement for prospective emigrants 
justifiable in a liberal state? Brock thinks that taxation and service are 
normatively on a par. By contrast, Blake thinks that public service is 
impermissible, and only justified under emergency conditions when the 
liberal state itself is under threat. I argue that neither Brock nor Blake have 
adequately argued their case. Brock’s normative grounds for obligations 
and how exactly prospective emigrants incur enforceable obligations are 
not spelled out in sufficient detail. As a result, she is too quick to draw an 
analogy between taxation and service requirement, without considering 
the morally salient difference between the two. I discuss a plausible 
ground, fair reciprocity in social cooperation, and draw out its implications 
for Brock’s view.  By contrast, Blake has not adequately shown that 
restricting life plans directly is unjustifiable, while restricting life plans 
indirectly by reducing the resources available to persons is justifiable. His 
account only shows that public service requires a different, more 
compelling justification than taxation. He does not, however, offer 
adequate support for the extreme justificatory burden he places on public 
service requirement. Both authors owe us an account of the resources and 
powers that can be legitimately claimed for purposes of social justice; 
whether there is a tenable normative boundary between transferring 
resources to the needy versus providing socially useful services to them.
1  I am grateful to Paul Bou-Habib, Serena Olsaretti, the participants of the Debating 
Brain Drain Workshop at the Goethe University Frankfurt, and the anonymous referees for 
their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful for the 
support of the German Research Foundation (DFG) for enabling me to work on this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the hardest questions about the brain drain concerns the tension 
between the needs of source populations and the freedom of the migrating 
professionals, and whether any kind of constraint on the latter is ever 
justifiable. Gillian Brock and Michael Blake’s Debating Brain Drain takes 
on this difficult challenge, provides a rich set of normative arguments, and 
shows how they figure in the policy arena of skilled labor migration. The 
normative discussion assumes the perspective of poor source country 
governments that face the task of ethically guided policy-design in a deeply 
unjust world, where wealthy receiving countries fail to discharge their 
duties of international justice. What may source countries permissibly do 
to address the problem of high skilled emigration?
In this commentary, I focus on a key disagreement between Brock and 
Blake. Is a public service requirement for prospective emigrants justifiable 
in a liberal state? Brock thinks that taxation and service are normatively on 
a par. By contrast, Blake thinks that public service is an impermissible 
path to liberal justice, and only justified under emergency conditions when 
the liberal state itself is under threat. I argue that neither Brock nor Blake 
have adequately argued their case. Brock’s grounds of obligations and how 
exactly prospective emigrants incur enforceable obligations are not spelled 
out in sufficient detail. As a result, she is too quick to draw an analogy 
between taxation and service requirement, without considering the 
morally salient difference between the two. By contrast, Blake’s account 
only shows that public service requires a different, more compelling 
justification than taxation, and does not show that it is impermissible in 
liberal states. Blake does not offer adequate support for the extreme 
justificatory burden he places on a public service requirement.
1. RECIPROCITY AND THE BENEFITS OF SOCIAL 
COOPERATION
Brock provides a variety of reasons why skilled emigrants have moral 
obligations towards their country of origin or training.  These include the 
duty to reciprocate for the benefits received; fair return for government 
investment; loyalty to fellow citizens in upholding institutions; 
responsibility for creating disadvantage, and responsibility for the 
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unintended harmful side effects of skills shortage. These special moral 
responsibilities, Brock argues, jointly provide the ground for state 
restrictions on emigration (Brock and Blake 2015: 65-68).
The various sources of duties that serve as the building blocks of Brock’s 
position problematically draw together two separate normative questions: 
1) Do skilled workers have moral responsibilities towards their country of 
training or origin? 2) Can states legitimately coerce them to discharge 
those responsibilities? (also see Eyal and Hurst 2014) A variety of moral 
obligations may arise from brain drain, but not all of them are legitimately 
enforceable in a liberal state. We need to unpack the grounds of obligations 
owed by emigrants towards those who remain, and analyze more precisely 
the way in which they give rise to obligations that are enforceable by liberal 
states.
I focus on two related grounds for emigration restrictions, both of which 
concern what persons owe to their society in virtue of having received 
certain benefits, in particular, those of education and of social cooperation 
more generally. These grounds are: (a) that governments must pursue a 
fair return on their investments and (b) the duty to reciprocate for the 
benefits received from social cooperation. As Brock writes, “governments 
are entitled to claim compensation from those who will benefit from their 
investment” (Brock and Blake 2015: 68). Skilled professionals accumulate 
“debts that are typically discharged by being a productive member of that 
society in adulthood” (Brock and Blake 2015: 68).
The argument for fair return on investment rests on the idea that the 
education and training of medical skills, both in public and private 
institutional settings, may be seen as part of a collective enterprise jointly 
sustained by all through research, training, health care, which involve a 
broad range of social and economic resources, the rule of law, general 
services and infrastructure, public safety, human corps, and so on (Brock 
and Blake 2015: 76). Poor countries allocate scarce public resources to 
supply socially valuable skills, such as medical training, and they do that 
with the expectation that trained doctors will deliver health care services 
over the course of their productive lifetime.
How do individuals incur enforceable obligations for enjoying the social 
goods jointly produced in a cooperative scheme? How should we 
understand the underlying ideal of justice or fairness and the nature of the 
normative relationship that gives rise to such obligations? These are the 
questions that need further analysis for a better understanding of Brock’s 
position. 
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One possible way of understanding the basis of reciprocity owed by the 
emigrants may be the contribution made by those left behind. On a 
contribution based reciprocity account, however, duties of distributive 
justice arise only among (potential) net contributors to the cooperative 
surplus. The unappealing implication of this account is that those who, for 
whatever reason, lack the capacity to contribute are not entitled to social 
resources.2 This account would be inconsistent with Brock’s moral concern 
with the unfulfilled needs of those left behind and her commitment to the 
imperative of moral equality, according to which “[a]ll human beings 
needs and interests matter … and deserve equal consideration” (Brock and 
Blake 2015: 25). So why reciprocity is owed to everyone, and not merely to 
(potential) contributors, requires a different justification.
A more plausible account of why would-be emigrants have obligations 
to their home society is rooted in the idea of fair reciprocity in social 
cooperation (Rawls 1971). The departure from the contribution-based 
account is that moral standing is not attached to the capacity to contribute 
to the social product. The fair reciprocity account acknowledges the 
morally arbitrary distribution of natural abilities. Moreover, it recognizes 
that a person’s capacity to contribute depends in part on the design of the 
cooperative framework and the rules that govern the production and 
distribution of social goods. It starts from an assumption of fundamental 
moral equality, so the terms on which social goods are produced and 
confer value on the talents and abilities of individuals must be justified 
from a benchmark of equality. Fair terms render the benefits drawn from 
the scheme of morally legitimate entitlements. What equal citizens owe 
one another and governments may justifiably enforce is the duty that each 
plays their part in upholding the fair terms of cooperation.
 According to Brock the minimal requirement of a fair scheme is that its 
social and political arrangements support “the core ingredients for a 
decent life” (Brock and Blake 2015: 25). When the labor supply for one or 
more of these core ingredients is critically low, those who lack secure 
access to these important goods have a reasonable complaint. The 
complaint is that when emigrating professionals leave and deploy their 
skills abroad unconditionally,they fail to discharge part of their duty of fair 
reciprocity in sharing the burdens and benefits of an ongoing scheme of 
social cooperation. This, on my view, is the more plausible way of spelling 
out the idea of reciprocity underlying Brock’s account. However, there are 
two problems that arise: 1) Do higher burdens depend on higher capacity? 
2) Is a compulsory public service requirement included in the fair terms of 
cooperation? 
2  For a critical discussion of this view see, for example, Buchanan (1990).
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The first is a matter of clarification. Brock thinks that those with greater 
capacity should contribute more. As she writes, we “often think it fair to 
treat people differently on the basis of the varying ways in which they can 
contribute to promoting justice” (Brock and Blake 2015: 245). We do this, 
according to her, when we accept differential tax burdens. On an account 
of justice as fair reciprocity, however, differential contributions to uphold 
fair terms do not, strictly speaking, depend on differential capacities. The 
idea is not that those with higher talents or skills ought to shoulder greater 
burdens, because they are more talented, as Brock seems to think. Rather, 
the idea is that they may legitimately expect higher social rewards for their 
initially undeserved capacities on the condition that background 
institutions are fairly arranged to the benefit of the least advantaged. A 
fairly organized social scheme has to strike a difficult balance between 
providing incentives for the talented to develop and deploy their skills and 
allowing them to obtain benefits on terms that those who gain less have no 
reason to reject. This, I believe, is a more plausible way of understanding 
the normative underpinnings of a fair tax system.
The second problem runs deeper and concerns a key disagreement 
between Brock and Blake. Should upholding fair terms of cooperation 
include a public service requirement for would-be emigrants, as Brock 
thinks? Or is compulsory public service an impermissible requirement of 
liberal justice, as Blake thinks? (I return to Blake’s account in the next 
section.) Brock seems to think that there is no morally significant 
distinction between making societal demands on a person’s material 
resources and her labor, so the move from income tax to a one or two-year 
public service requirement is a relatively straightforward one. She argues 
that if the coercive state practice of redistributive taxation is justified for 
the benefit of others, then providing services that involve our labor may 
also be required for the benefit of others. Brock draws the analogy between 
the two when she writes that “redistributive taxation involves, in effect, 
having to labor for the benefit of others” (Brock and Blake 2015: 97). While 
I welcome her conclusion that a highly conditional service requirement 
may sometimes be justified, her claim that taxation and service are 
analogous is too quick, and unfounded. There are relevant disanalogies 
between requiring persons to pay taxes and to dedicate labor hours to 
sustain background justice. These disanalogies require careful 
consideration before we can draw the conclusion that mandatory service, 
of some sort, is permissible for furthering social justice. 
Liberal political morality draws a sharp distinction between two 
aspects of rightful ownership of our talents. It holds that persons have a 
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strong, nearly exclusive, right to control what happens to their capacities 
and how they are put to use. The right to control the use of our talents is 
justified by reference to our fundamental interest in autonomy and 
pursuing valuable ends for ourselves.  By contrast, the right to draw 
material benefits from the use of our talents importantly depends on the 
contribution and cooperation of others. Rightful ownership of the material 
benefits depends on the idea of fairness embodied in the terms of social 
cooperation (Christman 1991). So how we use our talents and what kind of 
benefits we may permissibly obtain are justified in a different way. The 
normative distinction between the right to control the use of our talents 
and the right to benefit from our talents is thought to ground the moral 
significance of the distinction between service and taxation, at least 
among liberals.
The challenge for Brock, then, is whether she can provide an adequate 
justification of compulsory service consistent with her liberal 
commitments. Does she think that a person’s right to control the use of her 
talent can sometimes be restricted by liberal states? The conditions under 
which such a restriction is justified would need to be spelled out and shown 
to be consistent with liberalism. At places, Brock seems to cross the bounds 
of liberal political morality. She writes, that “[t]hose people who have 
received the necessary training are, in a way and in part, community 
investments” (Brock and Blake 2015: 62). It is important to distinguish the 
skills that are developed and trained through societal investment from the 
persons who carry them. Skills are in a way and in part community 
investments for which fair returns may be claimed. But persons themselves 
are not. Much depends, then, on how Brock would, if pressed on this point, 
fill in “in a way” and “in part” in the sentence above. She would need to 
elaborate on how exactly skills depend on the investment made by others, 
and how, in virtue of this contribution-dependence, state restrictions on 
the deployment of skills may be justified.
There is another more general understanding of fairness as fair play 
that comes to the fore in parts of Brock’s account. She relies on a general 
principle of fairness when she argues that emigrants owe a fair return for 
the benefits received from their home society. The principle of fairness 
holds that when people engage in a benefit-producing activity they incur 
enforceable obligations to do their fair share (Olsaretti 2013). In the joint 
production of a public good, such as public safety or public health, everyone 
who enjoys the benefits should do their fair share. However, even on this 
account, further argument would be needed on Brock’s part. There is 
considerable disagreement about the nature of the good produced, the 
nature of cooperation, and the relevant constraints under which the fair 
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play principle applies. Is the intention to benefit from the scheme a 
necessary condition? Or is the idea that the goods produced are taken to be 
“presumptively beneficial” sufficient to incur obligations? (Klosko 1987) 
These are some of the questions Brock would need to answer for a more 
compelling account of prospective emigrants’ enforceable fair share. 
To conclude, Brock still owes us an account of how we should understand 
the moral significance of the distinction between taxation and public 
service, and under what conditions the state can restrict the right to control 
the way we deploy our talents and skills. Her answer from consent 
underpinning educational contracts does not go far enough because it 
does not address the deeper question raised here about the terms of 
cooperation we may justifiably consent to, in the first place. Are the terms 
of the contract the state offers to students fair to start with? If so, why?
2. THE JUSTIFICATORY BURDEN FOR TAXATION AND 
PUBLIC SERVICE
Blake’s response to the alleged analogy between taxation and public 
service is that this is the inverse of an old argument made by Robert Nozick, 
who famously objected to redistributive taxation as tantamount to forced 
labor (Nozick 1974). Brock, according to Blake, should be seen as turning 
the above claim around: if we think income taxes are permissible then we 
should also think that forced labor is permissible (Brock and Blake 2015: 
174). Blake thinks that both of them are wrong for the same reason, so what 
could be said in response to Nozick should be a good enough response to 
Brock. 
Blake here rehearses the standard liberal view according to which 
individuals have an exclusive right to decide what happens to their bodies 
and how they use their talents, which bars others from interfering. 
However, they do not have an exclusive right to the income that flows from 
the use of their talents. Talents are considered inviolable, personal 
resources not up for grabs for social purposes, and should not be distributed 
in the name of social justice. By contrast, income and wealth are social 
resources that may be claimed appealing to the idea of fairness in 
cooperation.
In the remaining part of my commentary I analyze this fundamental 
difference between Brock and Blake’s view. Are talents and labor hours 
more similar to organs and body parts as Blake thinks, or closer to income 
and wealth, as Brock thinks? I cannot hope to settle this question in a short 
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commentary or provide an alternative answer in the space available.3 What 
strikes me as problematic in Blake’s reply, however, is that he simply takes 
for granted this sharp distinction. In responding to Brock he does not 
argue for the view, but rather, spells it out. I do not claim that there should 
not be any distinction at all between what kind of powers and resources we 
can and cannot claim for purposes of social justice. I do think, however, 
that the way we draw the line should be more carefully examined. The 
question to be asked is whether there is a normatively relevant distinction 
between the use of our talents and the benefits that flow from them that 
renders the former inviolable. 
Cécile Fabre (2006) has questioned the standard liberal way of drawing 
the boundary and whether we have an exclusive right to control our body 
and person. She argues for a highly qualified right to personal integrity. Her 
starting point is that the state should provide its citizens with a minimally 
flourishing life, including opportunities to form and revise their plans of 
life. With respect to others who fall below the threshold of sufficiency, “if it 
is true that we lack the right to withhold access to material resources from 
those who need them, we also lack the right to withhold access to our 
person from those who need it” (Fabre 2006: 2). She endorses an analogy 
between distributing social resources to those in dire need and distributing 
“personal” resources. That is, under conditions of extreme deprivation, 
other persons may have a justified claim to things liberals take to be 
inalienable parts of our person. These things, on Fabre’s account, include 
the body, its organs, the maternal womb, and our talents and skills that are 
necessary for addressing the basic needs of others. 
Fabre’s endorsement of the legitimacy of transgressing bodily integrity 
(under certain limited circumstances) is highly controversial. The idea of 
“body exceptionalism”, namely the belief that there is “a prophylactic line 
that comes close to making the body inviolate, that is, making body parts 
not parts of social resources at all” (Dworkin 1983), is an important liberal 
assumption that I do not question here. I do think, however, that Fabre’s 
question, i.e. whether skills (rather than talents) and labor may be 
considered social resources to be claimed by others under conditions of 
extreme scarcity, is worth considering in the context of the brain drain. 
The question is whether there is a tenable normative boundary between 
transferring resources to the needy versus providing socially useful 
services to them. 
What distinguishes the use of talents from the income that flows from 
them, according to Blake, is that talents come attached to persons. There is 
3  I argue for a middle ground between their two positions in Kollar (manuscript) .
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a difference between the coerced transfers of goods and coerced restrictions 
of life plans. He writes that life plans are a “more dangerous and difficult 
site of coercion” (Brock and Blake 2015: 175). I argue that Blake has not 
adequately shown that restricting life plans directly is unjustifiable, while 
restricting life plans indirectly, by reducing the resources available to 
persons, is justifiable. In fact, he has only claimed that there is a difference 
between the two, and that restricting life plans directly is more difficult to 
justify. So, if his objection to Brock is that taxation and service require 
different justifications, and that the latter requires very compelling 
reasons, then we agree. There is still room for disagreement concerning 
what counts as adequate or strong enough liberal justification for coercively 
restricting life plans. 
On one extreme, Blake thinks that the justificatory burden is so high 
that only a state of emergency can meet it. Only states that face emergencies 
may permissibly suspend liberal rights. He also thinks that the current 
critical health worker shortage in Sub-Saharan Africa might qualify as 
such a dire situation (Brock and Blake 2015: 210).4 On the other extreme, 
Fabre thinks that those in dire need have legitimate claims on the material 
resources as well as service provision of the provider, as long as they do not 
jeopardize the provider’s prospects for a minimally flourishing life. 
On my view there is a plausible middle ground between these two 
extremes. We need not put the bar of justification as high as the state of 
emergency, as Blake does. The claim that liberal states can justifiably 
restrict our right to control the use of our talents under less than emergency 
conditions is what would need to be established here.5 We should also not 
put the bar of justification as low as the service provider’s claim to a 
minimally flourishing life, as Fabre does. Instead, we may set the relevant 
circumstances to be unfavorable conditions of extreme scarcity in skills for 
essential goods, and make service requirement conditional upon the 
provider’s prospect for a reasonably autonomous life.  It seems that under 
conditions of critical skills shortage, where non-coercive incentives have 
proved to be futile, a carefully designed short-term compulsory service 
program that allows ample room for the personal autonomy of prospective 
emigrants may be justified. Forcing a medical graduate in South Africa to 
deliver health care services locally for 20 years is clearly ruled out because 
neither the critical shortage nor the reasonable autonomy conditions are 
met. A one-year service requirement in Sierra Leone may, however, pass 
4  I have argued elsewhere why I think Blake’s emergency justification of compulsory 
medical service fails. See Kollar (2016) and the response by Blake (2016).
5  I argue elsewhere that a qualified service requirement may be part of the fair 
terms of benefiting from skills across borders under conditions of extreme scarcity in source 
countries. See Kollar (2016: fn. 3).
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the test of an autonomy-sensitive measure under extreme skills shortage 
and resource scarcity coupled with the dire burden of disease. 
To conclude, I have argued that Blake has not successfully shown that 
public service is an unjustifiable policy measure in a liberal state. He has 
only shown that it requires a more compelling justification than taxation. 
Blake thinks that a public service requirement amounts to the suspension 
of a liberal right that requires an emergency justification. I think that under 
unfavorable social conditions, public service may be justified as a moral 
constraint on our right to control our talents. The question is a complex 
one and our divergence in the answer points to a deep, but reasonable, 
disagreement.
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